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Clarity in Jewish Thought
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Arno Weinstein
Reality
has demonstrated the great difficulty, both on a theoretical plane and
a practical level, of writing on the topic of Jewish thought and
practice. I am referring not only to the complexity of the subject
matter, but to the highly polarized positions maintained within the
entire field of study. Historians, philosophers, and theologians have
long deliberated the seminal place Jewish thought and practice have
occupied in occidental, and to a lesser extent, oriental histories.
However, unique is the group (institution) and rare is the individual
for whom the serious nature of the issue has been apparent. Yet rarer
still, are those who have burdened themselves with the necessary and
due level of contemplation that Jewish thought deserved as well as
required in order to derive meaningful results.
In
our time, those who affix the title of Jewish thinker to their name or
have had others do so, are usually little more than modern ideologues
applying foreign ideologies where there belong Jewish ideas. On the
other side of the spectrum, there are those for whom Jewish thought
consists in the memorization of the historically (traditional) Jewish
texts and the mimicry of thought patterns of previous generations.
Generations, one must add, that have brought the Jewish people and
Jewish thought to the verge of collapse. It is abundantly clear that
both are products of incomplete and distorted understandings. Two
thousand years of Diasporic life have stunted and perverted the
reasoning behind and definition of Jewish thought in both of these
dominant schools.
Concerted
and intense intellectual labor must be applied toward the most pressing
and immediate exigency of the Jewish nation. Unification of Jewish
thought, clarification of purposes of the Jewish people, and the
meaning of the Land of Israel need, with all alacrity, to arrest Jewish
senses and consume Jewish thought. The Jewish people must understand
these elements as the fundamental concepts forming the Torah Idea of
the Nation of Israel. Without any one of these three components, the
Torah Idea of the Nation of Israel as a meaningful end is simply
without worth and is indeed false. We must view the Land of Israel as
fundamental to the purposes of Jewish existence, as well as for the
edification of both the Jews in the Land of Israel and those in the
Diaspora of the Judaic principles that will ensure the proper
understanding of Jewish statecraft and existence. The purpose of this
endeavor must be to promote the infusion of an agenda into Jewish
discourse, which as its object seeks the consolidation of Jewish
thought within the classical context.
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Be it maintained
that the Jewish people is a National-Religious people whose
fulfillment of purpose rests in the reclamation of Eretz Yisrael
and in the Jewish institutions that govern it. Unique among
the nations, only the Jewish people is a people for whom it
is a religious and national obligation to establish an independent
polity. As important to the physical reclamation of the land
is the physical return of the Jewish people to the biblically
promised lands of our forefathers. It is certain that this position,
wholly understood in all its significance, is not within the
realm of current public discourse.
Thinking Jews need have as their agenda
the construction of such a nation whose faith rests in G-d and
whose path is Torah. In every generation decisions must be made
and crossroads passed. In our time the Jewish people is blessed
in that it possesses the building block upon which to proceed.
We must make ours that generation which is confident of the
reality and truth of Divine Providence. With this knowledge,
the only failure is the refusal to act, and the lack of faith
that accompanies it. The test of each individual is in the actions
he takes, not the momentary success or apparent failure of the
endeavor.
Know that it is the obligation of all
men, and in particular the Jew, to strive for knowledge of the
truth and to act accordingly. Within reach is the restoration
of the Jewish nation as conceived by our Sages. The Jewish people
have only to possess the will in order to witness the fruition
of a true Jewish nation whose in-gathering is complete and whose
support of the Jewish community is unyielding and resolute.
Know that G-d has promised the Jewish people the Land of Israel
as the physical homeland for its national existence. Know also
that there can be no other reasons for the establishment of
a Jewish State other than for it to represent the totality of
Torah thought and observance. Put more succinctly, the only
viable Jewish state is a state in which Jews behave as Jews:
that the law of the land is the Law of the Jews. There is no
other way for one to justify the need for an independent Jewish
polity.
There have been many arguments along this
line and, of course, there are many opinions on this subject.
Yet, the one thing that cannot be denied is the time-transcending
idea, as well as the reality, of the existence of the Jewish
people. No doubt that every people wants to live and prosper;
however, the distinction for the Jewish people is clear -- there
is no need for the Jewish existence if it is not for the aims
served. These objectives are not within the realm of the mundane
-- they are, indeed, among the most sublime and holy of all
possible human ends.
The Centrality of the Land of Israel
For purposes of clarity and source reference,
it is required that authoritative Jewish texts be summoned to
demonstrate the position stated above. To begin this exploration,
the topic of a Jewish homeland and its natural consequence,
a Jewish polity, are to be examined.
The Rambam (Mimonides) writes:
It
is forbidden at all times to leave Eretz Yisrael for the Diaspora
except: to study Torah; to marry; or to save [one's property]
from the gentiles [lit. the worshippers of the stars and signs].
[After accomplishing these ends,] one must return to Eretz
Yisrael.
Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim, The
Laws of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 9.1
Maimonides continues in the same halakha:
Similarly,
one may leave Eretz Yisrael to do business. However, it is
forbidden [to leave with the intent] of settling permanently
in the Diaspora unless the famine in [the land] is so severe
that a dinar's worth of wheat is sold at two dinars. When
do these conditions apply? When one possesses financial resources
and food is expensive. However, if food is inexpensive, but
a person cannot find financial resources or employment and
has no money available, he may leave and go to any place where
he can find relief. Although it is permitted to leave [Eretz
Yisrael] under these circumstances, it is not pious behavior.
Behold, Mahlon and Kilyon were two of the great men of the
generation [of Ruth] and they left [Eretz Yisrael] only out
of great distress. Nevertheless, they were considered by G-d
to be worthy of death.2
Source for Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim,
The Laws of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 9:
Talmud
Bavli, Bava Batra, 91a, Our Rabbis taught: It is not permitted
to go forth from the Land of Israel to a foreign country unless
two se'ahs are sold for one sela'. R. Shimon said: [This is
permitted only] when one cannot find [anything] to buy, but
when one is able [to find something] to buy, even if a se'ah
cost a sela' one must not depart. And so said R. Shimon b.
Yohai: Elimelekh, Mahlon and Kilyon were [of the] great men
of their generation, and they were [also] leaders of their
generation. Why, then, were they punished? Because they left
Eretz Yisrael for a foreign country; for it is written, And
all the city was astir concerning them, and the women said:
Is this Naomi? What [is meant by] 'is this Naomi?' -- R. Yitzhak
said: They said, 'Did you see what befell Naomi who left Eretz
Yisrael for a foreign country?'
Talmud Bavli, Bava Batra, 91a,
R. Hanan b. Raba said in the name of Rav: Elimelekh and Salmon
and Peloni Almoni and the father of Naomi all were sons of
Nahshon, the son of Aminadav [Sh'mot 5:23]. What does
he come to teach us [by this statement]? -- That even the
merit of one's ancestors is of no avail when one leaves the
Land for a foreign country.
Rational
thought dictates that a man not leave his household in most
circumstances and especially in times of difficulty. At the
moment in which desperation is at hand, the virtuous display
fortitude, strength and most of all presence. The act of leaving,
to be conceived of as moral, would require great benefit for
the whole of the family and its purposes. When the nation of
Israel is understood as the obligation of all its members it
is easier to make the comparison to a family and household.
As to the reverence placed upon the meaning of holiness ascribed
to the Land is, of course, parabolic and intended to draw our
attention to the overall significance of Eretz Israel to the
purposes of the Jewish people. Without the Land the polity could
not exist. Just as without a dwelling place a family is but
more individuals in a group, not significant or unique in their
identity or culture, mores or habits. A very often quoted reference
to this idea is the following halakha.
Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim, The Laws
of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 10.
Great
Sages would kiss the borders of Eretz Yisrael, kiss its stones,
and roll in its dust. Similarly, it says: Behold, your servants
hold her stones dear and cherish her dust. [Tehillim
102:15]3
Source for Halakha 10:
Talmud
Bavli, Ketuvot, 112a, R. Hisda stated: What [was meant]
by the Scriptural text, I give thee a pleasant land, the heritage
of the deer? Why was the Land of Israel compared to a deer?
-- To tell that as the skin of a deer cannot contain its flesh
so cannot the Land of Israel contain its produce. Another
explanation: As the deer is the swiftest among the animals
so is the Land of Israel the swiftest of all lands in the
ripening of its fruit. If [one should suggest that] as the
deer is swift but his flesh is not fat so is the Land of Israel
swift to ripen but its fruits are not rich, it was explicitly
stated in Scripture, Flowing with milk and honey [thus indicating
that they are] richer than milk and honey.
When
R. Zera went up to the Land of Israel and could not find a
ferry wherein to cross [a certain river] he grasped a rope
bridge and crossed. Thereupon a certain Sadducee sneered at
him: 'Hasty people, that put your mouths before your ears
[Na'ase V'nishma' -- Sh'mot 24:7], you are still, as
ever, clinging to your hastiness.' 'The spot,' the former
replied, 'which Moshe and Aharon were not worthy [of entering],
who could assure me that I should be worthy?' R. Abba used
to kiss the cliffs of Acco. R. Hannina used to repair its
obstacles. R. Ammi and R. Assi used to rise [from their seats
to move] from the sun to the shade and from to the shade to
the sun. R. Hiyya b. Gamda rolled himself in its dust, for
it is said in the Scripture, For Thy servants take pleasure
in her stones, and love her dust. [Tehillim 102:15]
The parabolic reference to the Land is
very clear. The reason for the Land is its existence as place,
not just any place, but the place in which revelation is to
be actualized. The meaning of the deer and of the milk and honey
becomes obvious when understood as it was intended by the Sages.
That is, as the place in which the maturation of the true polity
is possible only through the use of the laws that instruct the
taking of the Land in the first place. The polity dictated by
the law exceeds the otherwise and commonly accepted use of the
Land. The concepts as articulated by the authentic Jewish polity
once actualized indeed exceed the physical borders of the Land
and have universal consequences.
A Jew who dwells in the Land ultimately
is a reference to the Jew that not only subsists in Eretz Israel,
but lives according to the statues defining life in the Land.
Therefore, even one who transgresses is afforded forgiveness
within the scope of the law of the Jewish polity. It is the
system of law that gives definition to habitation in the Land
and as a consequence, meaning to the Land. The halakha relating
to this issue is the following.
Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim, The Laws
of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 11.
The
Sages said: The transgressions of one who dwells in Eretz
Yisrael are forgiven, as it says: The inhabitant shall not
say, 'I am sick.' The people who dwell there shall be forgiven
for their transgressions. [Isaiah 33:24]
Even one who walks four cubits there
will merit the World to Come and one who is buried there receives
atonement as though the place in which he is were an altar
of atonement, as it says: His land will atone for his people.
[D'varim 32:43] [In contrast, the prophet, Amos [Amos
7:17], used the expression] You shall die in an impure land
-- a prophecy of retribution.
There is no comparison between [the
merit of] a person who lives in Eretz Yisrael and one brought
there after death [for burial]. Nevertheless, great Sages
would bring their dead there. Take an example from our Fathers,
Ya'akov and Yosef, the righteous.
Source for Halakha 11:
Talmud
Bavli, Ketuvot, 111a, R. Eleazar said: Whoever is domiciled
in the Land of Israel lives without transgression, for it
is said in Scripture, And the inhabitants shall not say, 'I
am sick'; the people that dwell therein shall be forgiven
their iniquity. [Isaiah 33:24] Said Raba to Rav Ashi: we apply
this to those who suffer from disease.
R. Anan said: Whosoever is buried in
the Land of Israel is deemed to be buried under the altar;
since in the latter it is written in Scripture, An altar of
earth shalt thou make for me, [Sh'mot 20:21] and in respect
to the former it is written in Scripture, And his land doth
make expiation for his people. [D'varim 32:43]
. . . And the spirit to walk therein
[Isaiah 42:5], of it, said R. Yirmeyahu b. Abba in
the name of R. Yohanan, that whoever walks four cubits in
the Land of Israel is assured a place in the World to Come.
As a participant in the making of the
Jewish polity, the individual Jew has assumed upon himself certain
fundamental understandings of self and nation. Within this context
is the presupposition of revelation as true (i.e., the laws
of the Torah transcend time and that human nature remains constant).
The notion of Torah as a time transcending document is exhibited
in the previous halakhot while the idea of unchanging human
nature is first addressed with the halakha that follows and
secondly discussed in the following subsection of this work.
Mishne Torah, Sefer Shoftim, The Laws
of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 5, Halakha 12.
At
all times, a person should dwell in Eretz Yisrael, even in
a city whose population is primarily of worshippers of idols,
rather than dwell in the Diaspora in a city whose population
is primarily Jewish.
In that all who leave [the land] for
the Diaspora is as though he worships idols, as it is says:
They have driven me out today from dwelling in the heritage
of G-d, saying, 'Go serve other gods.' [Shmuel I 26:19]
Similarly, [Ezekiel's (13:9) prophecies of] retribution state:
They shall not come to the Land of Israel.
Just as it is forbidden to leave the
Land for the Diaspora, so it is forbidden to leave Bavel for
other lands, as it is written: They shall be brought to Bavel
and there they shall be [until I take notice of them . . .
and restore them to this place, i.e. the Land of Israel].
[Jeremiah 27:22]5
Source Halakha 12:
Talmud
Bavli, Ketuvot, 110b, Our Rabbis taught: One should always
live in the Land of Israel, even in a town most of whose inhabitants
are idolaters, but let no one live outside the Land, in a
town most of whose inhabitants are Israelites; for whoever
lives in the Land of Israel may be considered to have a G-d,
but whoever lives outside the Land may be regarded as one
who has no G-d. For it is said in Scripture, To give you the
Land of Canaan, to be your G-d. [Vayikra 25:38] Has
he, then, who does not live in the Land, have no G-d? But
[this is what the text intended] to tell you, that whoever
lives outside the Land may be regarded as one who worships
idols. Similarly it was said in Scripture in [the story of]
David, For they have driven me out this day that I should
not cleave to the inheritance of the L-rd, saying: Go, serve
other gods. [Shmuel I 26:9] Now, whoever said to David,
'Serve other gods'? But [the text intended] to tell you that
whoever lives outside the Land may be regarded as one who
worships idols. [Tosafot,'Avoda Zara, 5]
The Jew living outside the Land, constitutes
the worshipping of idols because doing so denies the foundations
of the Torah, i.e., the enactment of the Torah, and the living
by the statutes of the Law. The project of enacting the Torah
can only be legally accomplished in the Land as defined by the
Law. The goal of Jewish practice is a single idea that can be
dissected into three interrelated and independent subsections.
The single idea is to know G-d, that is, to love G-d since the
limits of human knowledge subject man's knowing of G-d to the
loving of Him. Subsection one of the idea deals with individual
development; subsection two, with national development; and
subsection three impacts upon universal development of mankind.
Each subsection is dependent on the precepts of the Law, for
it is the Law that elucidates these subsections and places definitional
perimeters of their understanding. Development of self begins
with adherence to all commandments which, in turn, lead to the
national responsibility and finally its universal ramifications.
Again, it is the participation in the project and what that
participation says about the belief in the endeavor itself that
is so central. There is such a notion in Jewish law because
the foundation of Jewish practice is founded upon the creation
of an autonomous Jewish political entity in the Land of Israel.
At certain points in Jewish study the simplicity of this idea
is overwhelming.
Defining
a Nation
Many
important notions can be distilled from the halakhot cited
above. Before any such additional discussion ensues, it is
relevant to introduce yet another halakha that on the surface
might appear as a different topic altogether, yet is quite
meaningful and appropriate to the subject at hand and deals
directly with the final thoughts of the preceding section.
The
Rambam states in Yad Hazaka, Sefer HaMada' Hilkhot De'ot,
(1:5) the following:
It
is natural for a man's character and actions to be influenced
by his friends and associates and for him to follow the local
norms of behavior. Therefore, he should associate with the
righteous and be constantly in the company of the wise, so
that as to learn from their deeds. Conversely, he should keep
away from the wicked who walk in darkness, so as not to learn
from their deeds.
Solomon
said: He who walks with the wise will become wise, while one
who associates with fools will suffer. [Mishle 13:20]
And it is said: Happy is the man who has not followed the
advice of the wicked. [Tehillim 1:1]
A
person who lives in a place where the norms of behavior are
evil and the inhabitants do not follow the straight path should
move to a place where the people are righteous and follow
the ways of the good.
If
all the places with which he is familiar and of which he hears
reports follow improper paths, as in our times, or if he is
unable to move to a place where the patterns of behavior are
proper, because of gangs of raiding troops, or for health
reasons, he should remain alone in seclusion as it states:
Let him sit alone and be silent. [Eikha 3:28]
If
they are wicked and sinful and do not allow him to reside
there unless he mingle with them and follow their evil behavior,
he should go out to caves, thickets, and deserts so as not
to follow the paths of sinners as it says: Who will give me
a lodging place for wayfarers, in the desert. [Jeremiah
9:1]
How
is it that, on the one hand, the company a man keeps determines
his character and standing, and yet, on the other hand, a
Jew should dwell in the Land of Israel even in a place where
the majority of the inhabitants are idol worshippers? Is there
significance to the halakha from De'ot vis-a-vis the
halakha from Melakhim to remain in Eretz Yisrael? The
answer to the latter question is that all the halakhot interact
and combine in such a way as to accurately reflect the Law
of Torah. In this regard, as well as in numerous others, there
has been no greater Jewish thinker than Maimonides. He maintains
that man's soul is all too easily influenced and, unfortunately,
it is routinely for the bad. The most sound and legitimate
method of promoting a "healthy" soul is through first understanding
this concept and then through human example [see Shemona
Perakim]. That is to say, a man ought to conclude what
is wise and pious behavior from Biblical or post-Biblical
figures, and then he should surround himself with wise and
pious men. A society, however, should establish itself to
promote and then to maintain such an idea in the abstract;
and the atmosphere, in reality. Given the understanding of
human nature within the Jewish, as well as the classical,
context this method is the only way to perpetuate certain
values within a society. A society whose purpose it is to
transmit these ideas to its citizenry. As a result, an inescapably
important aspect of nationhood is the clarification and the
rational establishment of the humanly attainable. Know that
this is a premise of Torah and a truth of man in the physical
world. If this nation is properly understood, much of the
first question is answered. What mitigating circumstances
exist for Maimonides that he might negate the need for a man
to surround himself with righteous and wise men? This is the
overriding importance of the national existence of the Jewish
people in the Land of Israel. In addition to this demonstrable
notion regarding the Jewish national existence, it is the
Law. Needless to say, were all Jews to adhere to the halakha
of dwelling in the Land and of participating in the Jewish
polity; no Jew would need to live in a place inhabited mostly
by idol worshippers in the Land of Israel, rather than in
a place outside the Land inhabited mostly by Jews.
It
is clear from what the Rambam writes that the traditional
view of the role of the Land of Israel to the practice of
the Jewish religion is fundamental. An independent Jewish
polity is the cornerstone on which the very concept of Judaism
is built. That Torah is conceived as Law and that the fabric
of Jewish life is actualized within that Law, emphatically
denote that the achievement of this goal translates into the
existence of a national entity. This national existence, however,
is exercised exclusively as outlined in the covenant between
the Jewish people and G-d. The Rambam has made explicit that
which runs silently through every page of Tanakh. The entire
Jewish Bible has as its premise the national and religious
conception of the Jewish people. What this means in practical
terms is not at all simple nor is it apparent. A national
existence denotes a unified set of laws, common goals and
aspirations, and the combined will of the population to bring
to life that which is set forth on paper or conceived in the
mind's eye.
Let
it be said again that the Jewish people have today a unique
opportunity. Am Yisrael has before it the path that can either
lead it to the fulfillment of the 3500 year idea, that of
doing the will of G-d, or the path that leads nowhere. The
path that leads nowhere is not simply a euphemism for a journey
into the unknown, but rather it is a description of the road
that destroys, day by day, what is, within the human context,
the understanding of G-d. The definition of the desecration
of G-d's name is found on this path, the wrong path. By following
the latter path the Jewish people not only creates the Hillul
Hashem [desecration of G-d's name], but it exhibits disdain
for the memory of each and every past generation that sought
out the truth of human existence and martyred themselves for
the idea of Torah. What can the Jewish people possibly know
of itself other than its own purpose through revelation? We
cannot escape what is our obligation. We have no right to
reject that with which G-d has blessed us. It is time that
Jews act as Jews by coming to grips with that which is their
obligation, Torah Judaism.
The
Uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael
The
Rambam states in Yad Hazaka, Sefer 'Avoda, Hilkhot Beit
HaBehira, Perek 7, Halakha 12, the following:The entire
land of Eretz Yisrael is more sanctified than all other lands.
How is its holiness expressed? The Omer offering, the two
loaves [of Shavuot], and the first fruits must be brought
from its [territory] and cannot be brought from other lands.7
Thus,
the holiness of the Land is in the using of the Land as outlined
by Torah law. There is no intrinsic holiness to the soil of
Eretz Israel. The holiness of the Land is attained through
the proper use of the Land and attached to the Land by the
precepts of the Land. Those precepts are integral to all Torah
and by logical extension all commandments rest upon the Laws
of the Land.
In
Hilkhot Beit HaBehira, Perek 7, Halakha 13 it is stated:Eretz
Yisrael has ten gradations of holiness, each higher than the
preceding level. The cities that are surrounded by a wall
are holier than the rest of the Land.8
This
reaches the heart of the matter. The Jewish people is to establish
an order, a civil society, if you will, that G-d has ordained.
The fact that the walled city has greater holiness than the
unwalled city is for the simple reason that it is the walled
city that best exemplifies the established order, that is
to say, the working city. The walled city was the fortified
encampment of permanence and defense for its inhabitants;
the walled city is the civilized city. Whereas the unwalled
city was in ever-present danger of destruction and hence lacked
the substance possessed by the walled city and thereby its
purpose and/or sanctity. All human existence should be founded
upon the striving for man's end. The Jewish conception of
this idea, similar to the classical philosophical notion,
rests in the formation of a political entity that seeks purpose
as part and parcel of its national life. Judaism is the blueprint
for this idea. The Torah is the divine guide to the individual
as well as to the nation. There can be no Jewish life by definition
without this knowledge. The secularist cannot call the state
he wishes to create a Jewish state nor can the religious call
their existence outside of the political entity Jewish. They
are both wrong and they have both missed the fundamental idea
of Torah Judaism. They have failed to heed the words of the
Torah, of the Sages and of the Rambam. They have failed to
realize first, that an end must exist, and second, that the
end must be met, within the confines of human existence, at
all costs. Our Sages understood what the Rambam so clearly
articulated in his work. They understood that the need for
unified Jewish thought within the autonomous Jewish polity
was the essence of Torah and was the only method of achieving
that which G-d has chosen.
Levels
of holiness detail the importance of the thing or idea under
discussion. With ascending levels of holiness are attached
greater reverence and awe to alert the individual as well
as the nation to the significance of the object. It is therefore
important to take careful note of what is meant in the following
halakha.
Rambam
writes in Hilkhot Beit HaBehira, Perek 7, Halakha 14:
Jerusalem
is holier than all other walled cities. We must eat the sacrifices
of lesser sanctity and the second tithes within its walls.
The following restrictions were enacted in regard to Jerusalem:
No corpse is left within it overnight. Human bones cannot
be transported within it. Homes cannot be rented within it.
A resident alien may not be given the opportunity to settle
in the city. No graves may remain within it except for the
graves of the House of David and the grave of Huldah, the
prophetess, which were there from the days of the first prophets.
We should not plant gardens or orchards within the city. It
cannot be sowed or plowed, so that it will not smell foul.
No trees may be maintained in it, except for a rose garden
which was there from the days of the first prophets. We may
not maintain a garbage dump there, because of creeping animals.
We may not have balconies or protrusions extending into the
public domain because of Tum'at Ohel. We may not create furnaces
within it because of the smoke.
We may not raise chickens within it,
because they may cause ritually pure articles [to become impure].
Just as a Kohen may not raise chickens throughout Eretz Yisrael,
because they may cause ritually pure articles [to become impure].
A house in the city which is sold is
never designated as the permanent property of the buyer.
A house in the city is never designated
as leprous. It cannot be judged as an apostate city.
An Egla Arufa is never brought from
it.
[The last four apply] because [Jerusalem]
was never divided among the tribes.9
The capital of the nation is to be held in greater esteem
than all other cities for it is from there that political
authority is to emanate. The next several halakhot that immediately
follow the one cited above describe the increasing levels
of holiness found in the parts of the Beit HaMikdash. The
discussion culminates in Perek 8 with the laws of caring for
and guarding the Beit HaMikdash. The center of Jewish life
is articulated so eloquently by Maimonides in his writing
of the law for it is within the walls of the Beit HaMikdash.
that, inter alia, the Sanhedrin sits. That is to say, the
meaning of a Jewish commonwealth is ultimately found in the
relevance of the Beit HaMikdash. Know that this concept is
very sublime and requires great care and study to understand.
For
a contemporary discussion of the entire question of the value
placed upon living in the Land and then the need, from a Torah
perspective, of a Jewish commonwealth let us examine the words
of Rabbi J. David Bleich, a Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshiva University
and author of works on halakhic questions. Rabbi Bleich in
discussing the halakhic ramifications of settling in Eretz
Yisrael, which ultimately leads to the meaning of national
existence, as he views it, discusses five positions outlined
by former Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef,
in a paper contributed to the 5729 issue of Torah She-be'al
Peh. According to Rabbi Bleich, Rabbi Yosef states the
following:
Position
1
The
Ramban (Nachmanides) states that it is a positive mitzva to
dwell in Eretz Yisrael from his commentary on, And you shall
inherit the land and dwell therein. [Bamidbar 33:53]
In addition to the positive commandment to live in the Land,
the Ramban prohibits Jewry from establishing national settlements
outside Eretz Yisrael. The Ramban's position is repeated in
his commentary of the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvot.
In
Contemporary Halakhic Problems Volume I, Rabbi Bleich
writes:
Further
evidence that residence in Israel constitutes fulfillment
of a mitzva in our day as well may be gleaned from various
halakhic provisions which are apparently predicated upon this
rationale. Examples cited by Rabbi Yosef include permission
to allow a gentile to draw up a bill of sale on the Sabbath
on behalf of a Jew acquiring property in Eretz Yisrael from
a non-Jew (Gittin 8b) and the obligation of one renting
a dwelling in the Land of Israel to affix a mezuza immediately
upon taking up residence rather than thirty days thereafter
as in the Diaspora (Menahot 44a). R. Joseph Karo in
Beit Yosef, Yore De'a 286, explains that in the Diaspora
a new residence is not considered to be a permanent dwelling
place prior to the thirtieth day, whereas in Israel a new
home is immediately deemed to be a permanent domicile because
the act of residing therein constitutes the fulfillment of
a mitzva and hence acquires the characteristic of permanence.
Further
elucidation of this can be found in the sources:
Talmud
Bavli, Gittin 8b, says:
[Our
authority further says that] 'a field bought in Syria is like
one bought on the outskirts of Jerusalem.' What rule of conduct
can be based on this? R. Sheshet says: It means that a contract
for selling it [to a Jew] can be drawn up even on Shabbat.
What? On Shabbat? -- You know the dicta of Raba, 'He tells
a non-Jew to do it.' So here, he tells a non-Jew to draw up
the contract. And although there is a Rabbinical prohibition
against telling a non-Jew to do things on Shabbat [which we
may not do ourselves], where it was a question of furthering
the [Jewish] settlement of Eretz Yisrael the Rabbis did not
apply the prohibition.
Talmud
Bavli, Menahot 44a, says:
R.
Yehuda said: A borrowed garment is exempt from tzitzit for
the first thirty days, thereafter it is subject to it. So,
too, it was taught in a Baraita: He who stays at an inn
in the Land of Israel or who rents a house outside the Land
is, for the first thirty days, exempt from mezuza, thereafter
he is subject to it. But he who rents a house within the
Land of Israel is bound to affix a mezuza forthwith, in
order to maintain the settlement in the Land of Israel.
The
meaning of Talmud Bavli, Gittin 8b is that acquiring
parts of the Land of Israel takes president over the restrictions
of the Sabbath observance. As with the example of the affixing
of a mezuza upon a doorpost, for a Jew to inhabit the Land
of Israel is a clear commandment dictated by the Torah.
It is the ramifications of this commandment and the meaning
to be taken from the commandment that has become blurred
with the distortions of diasporic thought. However, this
position holds firm to the idea that living in the Land
of Israel is a commandment from the Torah. For the moment
we will leave aside the conclusions to be reached from this
idea.
Position 2
Rabbi
Yosef next addresses the argument proposed in Megillat
Ester, a commentary on the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvot,
by Rabbi Isaac de Leon, which maintains that the obligation
to live in Eretz Yisrael is no longer in force since the destruction
of the Beit HaMikdash. For this reason, states Rabbi de Leon,
the Rambam did not include the commandment to live in Eretz
Yisrael in his Sefer HaMitzvot. Ketuvot 111a in the gemara
is read, according to Megillat Ester, when it interprets
Shir HaShirim 2:7, as a warning not to rebel against the conquerors
of Israel or to take the Land by force. This gemara is an
often cited reason of the rejectionist "ultra-orthodox" for
extricating the commandment of living in the Land of Israel
from the Torah for all generations under the divinely ordained
yoke of exile. The gemara, therefore, warrants full citation
of appropriate sections and comment.
Talmud
Bavli, Ketuvot 111a, says:
They
shall be carried to Babylon, and there shall they be, until
the day that I remember them, saith the L-rd ( Jer.
27:22). And R. Zera? -- That text, it is written, to the
vessels of the ministry. And Rav Yehuda? -- Another text
is also is written: I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem,
by the gazelles, and by the hinds of the field, [that you
awaken not, nor stir up love (for the Land of Israel), until
it please] (Shir HaShirim 2:7). And R. Zera? -- That
implies that Israel shall not go up [as a people as if surrounded]
by a wall. And Rav Yehuda? -- Another I adjure you (Shir
HaShirim 3:5) is written in Scripture. And R. Zera?
-- That text is required for [an exposition] like that of
R. Yose son of R. Hanina who said: 'What was the purpose
of those three adjurations? [the two previous citations
plus Shir HaShirim 5:8] -- One, that Israel shall
not go up [as a people as if surrounded] by a wall; the
second, that whereby the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured
Israel that they shall not rebel against the nations of
the world; and the third is that whereby the Holy One, blessed
be He, adjured the gentile nations that they shall not oppress
Israel excessively.'
Rabbi
Yosef rejects this analysis of Maimonides' position on the
halakhic issue because (a) Maimonides includes in his enumeration
of the 613 commandments such precepts as the rebuilding of
the Temple, which in Maimonides' own opinion are not operative
prior to [sic] the Messianic era [Maimonides does not require
the actual personage of the Messiah to usher in the Messianic
era. Maimonides also does not require the mitzva of rebuilding
the Temple to wait for the Messiah. See Yad Hazaka, Sefer
Shoftim, Hilkhot Melakhim U'Milhamoteihem, viz. Halakhot
2 and 3; Hilkhot Beit HaBehira.], and (b) none of the
numerous statements contained in the talmudic and midrashic
works supporting the view that settlement in Israel is a positive
commandment in any way intimates that this commandment may
be binding only in certain epochs. Of particular note is the
statement in B'reshit Rabba LXXVI, explaining the reasons
for Jacob's fear that he might be vanquished in battle by
Esau. Jacob's foreboding was based on the fact the Esau had
acquired greater merit by virtue of having dwelt in Eretz
Yisrael uninterruptedly throughout the years spent by Jacob
in the house of Laban. In addition to the counter arguments
set forth by Rabbi Yosef, it is difficult to understand how
one interprets a Midrashic/Aggadic statement literally. It
is more difficult to imagine utilizing a literally interpreted
Midrash to establish a halakhic norm contradicting an explicit
commandment in the Tanakh. The gemara that follows
speaks directly to the merit of living in the Land and makes
no reference to the fact that the Jewish people are barred
from reestablishing a national entity. The weight of opposing
evidence draws out the difficulty in interpreting the lines
from Shir HaShirim as a literal ban on Jewish sovereignty
in the Land of Israel. The idea that generations of Jews are
excused from performing what G-d has deemed as the way of
life for mankind is an intolerable notion that rejects the
very foundations of Torah thought. Lastly, were we to take
this interpretation as a punishment from G-d, we would have
to ask if the gentile nations have not "broken" the "agreement"
by oppressing the Jewish people in most barbarous ways for
the nearly 2000 years of exile. When all is said and done,
the very idea that a removal of over one-third of the Torah
requirements (without the Land) could be a permissible understanding
of Torah is ludicrous. A word ought to be said about Rabbi
Yosef's interpretation of the Rambam's statement that one
of the proofs of the Messiah will be that he will build the
Beit HaMikdash. The Rambam's statement does not mean that
he will literally built it, but rather that he will either
see it completed (i.e., place the mezuza on the doorpost or
place a missing element of the structure in order) or that
he will give proper instruction to its use once it is built
(which could be before his coming). This is not a commandment
based solely on the arrival of the Messiah for the obligation
to build the Beit HaMikdash is clearly stated as an obligation
of all generations and has no restriction based upon the arrival
of the Messiah as was the case with the building of the Second
Beit HaMikdash.
Position 3
Rabbi
Yosef discusses the opinion of the Rashbam, who, while commenting
on Bava Batra 91a, holds that while living in the Land
is not specifically a positive injunction, it is nevertheless
forbidden to leave Eretz Yisrael other than in times of great
economic distress. The Rashbam maintained that living in the
Land was, in the words of Rabbi Bleich, "a preparatory step
to the fulfillment of commandments (hekhsher mitzvot), there
being numerous commandments which can be fulfilled only in
Israel." The opinion that living in the Land has some "pre-commandment"
nature to it will be discussed later in this work.
Position 4
This
position states that there can be halakhic reasons to negate
the doing of the Law. In a commentary to the gemara Ketuvot
110b a concept is put forth in which the dangers involved
with fulfilling the commandments regarding the Land of Israel
are too extreme and pose a danger to life sufficient enough
to preclude the performance of the mitzvot. Rabbi Yosef questions
the authenticity of Tosafot, Ketuvot 110b, attributed
to Rabbenu Chaim Kohen. It states that there is no obligation
to live in the Land due to the hardships associated with observing
the mitzvot tied to the Land of Israel. Additionally, the
statement itself does not negate the fact that dwelling in
the land does constitute a positive commandment only that
there might be overriding halakhic reasons not to fulfill
the mitzva of dwelling in the land. If this position can be
substantiated through the halakhic process then it would stand
to reason that should those reasons be overcome in the present
time, there would be no impediment to once again recognize
the need to perform this commandment. Hardships, meaning immanent
death, if it ever applied, does not now. There is no greater
threat to life in the Land of Israel than there is in New
York City, Moscow or London. The idea that there is greater
chance of spiritual death, of one's removal from Judaism,
in the exile is substantiated by the figures pertaining to
assimilation and intermarriage.
Position 5
Rabbi
Yosef pointedly argues with Rabbi Moshe Feinstein's opinion
as stated in Iggrot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer, 1, no. 102.
Rabbi Feinstein asserts that there exists two separate "categories
of positive commandments. There are precepts whose performance
is mandatory, e.g., circumcision, the donning of phylacteries,
etc., and others which are not mandated as obligatory responsibilities
but nevertheless, when indeed performed, constitute the fulfillment
of a commandment." [Bleich p.7] As has already been stated,
Rabbi Yosef interprets the Ramban very differently and therefore
the nature of the obligation of dwelling in the land.
It
is troubling to use the words of Reb Moshe, z"l, in
what ultimately amounts to the destruction of Jewish thought.
How is it possible that Judaism understands the actions of
man in such a distorted manner? The answer, of course, is
that it does not. Judaism can no more qualify the doing of
an action as a mitzva only after it is done than it can separate
the required activity of a Jew from his "extra" activity and
then deem it (i.e., the "extra" activity) as meritorious.
The logical conclusions to such thought are frightening at
best and otherwise distorted.
It
is worth a moment to address the position of Reb Moshe, z"l
on this topic. A full analysis would require an examination
of the foundations on which Rabbi Feinstein, z"l, has
built his opinion and then the extraction, to what ever extent
that is possible, of the resultant dilemmas that his view
might present. Our purpose at the moment, however, is only
to draw out some ideas maintained by Maimonides on the same
general theme. It is our hope that what is said below will
demonstrate how the statements made in the previous paragraph
were essentially conceived.
The
mishna Avot [3:18] attributes to Rabbi Akiva the following
statement:
Everything
is foreseen, yet freedom of choice has been given. The world
is judged according to the good, and everything depends on
the majority of what has been done.
Maimonides
comments: This saying comprises facts of the utmost importance
and is worthy of Rabbi Akiva. The following is a short explanation
which assumes familiarity with the preceding chapters: Everything
in the world is known to G-d and under His control. This is
expressed "Everything is foreseen." Then he continues, you
should not think that since all actions are already known,
they are necessarily fixed beyond control, i.e., that man
is forced to act in a particular way. This is not so, but
man has free will to do as he pleases. This is expressed "yet
freedom is given," i.e., everybody has a free will, as explained
in Shemona Perakim [the Rambam's introductory essay
to this mesekhet].
In
Shemona Perakim Maimonides writes:
The
statement found in the saying of the Rabbis, 'All is in
the power of G-d except the fear of G-d' [Rabbi Hanina:
B'rakhot 33b; Nidda 16b; Megilla 25a]
is, nevertheless, true, and in accord with what we have
laid down here. Men are, however, very often prone to err
in supposing that many of their actions, in reality the
result of their own free will, are forced upon them, as
for instance, marrying a certain woman, or acquiring a certain
amount of money. Such superstition is untrue. If a man espouses
and marries a woman legally, then she becomes his lawful
wife, and by his marrying her he has fulfilled the divine
command to increase and multiply. G-d, however, does not
decree the fulfillment of a commandment. If, on the other
hand, a man has consummated with a woman an unlawful marriage,
he has committed a transgression. But G-d does not decree
that a man shall sin. Again, suppose a man robs another
of money, steals from him, or cheats him, and then uttering
a false oath, denies it; if we should say that G-d has destined
that this sum should pass into the hands of the one out
of the possession of the other, G-d would be preordaining
an act of iniquity. Such, however, is not the case, but
rather that all of man's actions, which are subject to his
free will, undoubtedly either comply with, or transgress,
G-d's commands; for, as has been explained in Chapter II,
the commands and prohibitions of the Law refer only to those
actions with regard to which man has absolute free choice
to do, or refrain from doing. Moreover, to this faculty
of the soul (i.e., the freedom of the will) "the fear of
G-d" is subservient, and is, in consequence, not predestined
by G-d, but, as we have explained, is entirely in the power
of the human free will. By the word 'all', the Rabbis meant
to designate only the natural phenomena which are not influenced
by the will of man, as whether a person is tall or short,
whether it is rainy or dry, whether the air is pure or impure,
and all other such things that happen in the world, and
which have no connection with man's conduct.
Yet
another rationalization proffered by those in the Diaspora
for their failure to reside in the Land rests upon the distinction
between men and women and the obligation to conquer the Land.
In his analysis Rabbi Bleich notes a comment of Rabbenu Nissim,
Ketuvot 110b, T'shuvot Rashbash, no. 2, and
Maharit, II, no. 28, which makes the point that there
is no distinction between men and women regarding the fulfillment
of the mitzva to live in Eretz Yisrael.
Talmud
Bavli, Ketuvot, 110b,
Our
Rabbis taught: If [the husband] desires to go up [to the
Land of Israel] and his wife refuses she must be pressed
to go up; and if [she does] not [consent] she may be divorced
without a ketuba. If she desires to go up [to the Land of
Israel] and he refuses, he must be pressed to go up; and
if [he does] not [consent] he must divorce her and pay her
ketuba. If she desires to leave [the Land of Israel] and
he refuses to leave [the Land of Israel], she must be pressed
not to leave, and if [pressure is of] no [avail] she may
be divorced without a ketuba. If he desires to leave [the
Land of Israel] and she refuses he must be pressed not to
leave, and if [coercion is of] no [avail] he must divorce
her and pay her ketuba.
It
is further stated that the commandment of living in Eretz
Yisrael entails not only inhabiting the country but also possessing
the Land by ruling over it and acquiring territory. Bleich
continues that "Rashbaz views these tasks [the latter two]
as being male prerogatives and rules that women are exempt
from this commandment." [Bleich p.12] What Rabbi Bleich neglects
to insert plainly and clearly is that the obligation to dwell
in the Land is assumed without question.
This
brings us to the Rambam and what appears to be his exclusion
of living in Eretz Yisrael as a positive commandment. It is
clear that the Rambam made certain assumptions regarding the
human condition, that is, what comes natural to man. By nature,
man is a political being. He is, from a Torah perspective,
a social creature whose fundamental need is to associate with
his fellow man. This once understood, and taking into account
the nature of the halakha derived by Maimonides from the sources,
it must be understood that a national existence is an assumed
state of being for man. That the Jew has his own set of codes,
laws, and customs is part and parcel of the will of G-d. That
the Jew should exist as a separate entity, apart from all
other nations, is also the will of G-d. That the Jew is to
exist separately with his own codes, laws, and customs in
a national setting is a given. It is as if the Rambam would
have been forced to explain that in order for a man to don
t'fillin at morning prayer, he would first be required to
wake from his sleep. It is only natural that man be awake
at morning prayer and at the time of wearing the t'fillin;
therefore, it is superfluous to state as much. Likewise, the
natural state of man requires that he live within a society
of men with similar ends. To state that the Jewish people
must fulfill, what from all religious and rational perspectives
seem obvious, would be a waste of words and a corruption of
the concept of Mitzva. [The Rambam is most careful not to
waste words or dilute ideas. For a better idea of his position
see More Nevukhim, Introduction to Treatise.] We realize that
without waking in the morning no mitzvot can be performed,
so to, must we understand that without a Jewish national existence
the will of Hashem remains unfulfilled, as well as a majority
of the Taryag Mitzvot.
The
state, from the position of the Rambam, is very much akin
to the tools of the sculptor. It is there to mold the character
of the Jewish people, to formulate the correct set of guidelines
for each generation, all within the primary notions of Torah.
Without the commonwealth there can be no Jewish existence.
It
is not paradoxical that the Rambam should set as law that
the Jew is to live among the idol worshippers if it be in
Eretz Yisrael rather than with Jews in Galut. We are told
to override the halakha in Hilkhot De'ot, Perek Vav,
Halakha Alef (cited above) in order to fulfill the halakha
of dwelling in the Land. Know that Maimonides is resolute
in his position that a Jewish polity is a given, an assumed
presupposition for the actualization of Torah Law.
Jewish
Nation, Jewish Land
Rabbi
Bleich reexamines many of the same issues from another perspective
in the second volume of Contemporary Halakhic Problems. While
discussing the status of Yehuda and Shomron in chapter 9,
page 189-190, of his book, Rabbi Bleich makes the following
point regarding the central nature of the Land from the perspective
of the Torah:
The
claim of the community of Israel to the Land of Israel in
its entirety as its historic homeland is predicated upon
G-d's covenant with Abraham (Genesis 15:7-21). However,
with regard to three specific geographical areas -- the
Cave of Makhpela, the Temple Mount, and Shekhem -- title
to the land is based upon more conventional grounds. These
particular sites are described in Scripture as having become
the property of our ancestors by right of purchase long
before they acquired title to the rest of the Land of Canaan.
The uniqueness of these areas is underscored by the sages
of the Midrash (B'reshit Rabba 79:7). Why implied,
queries the Midrash, is the narrative concerning Abraham's
purchase of the sepulcher in the field of Makhpela spelled
out in such minute detail (Genesis 23:3-17)? Why
does the Bible so carefully identify the individual from
whom David purchased the Temple Mount (II Samuel
24:18-25)?
Why
does the Torah relate that Jacob pitched his tent for the
sum of 100 kesita (Genesis 33:19)? Answers the Midrash:
'So that the nations of the world will not be able to taunt
Israel saying, "These [lands] are in your possession by
virtue of theft."' These historical facts are recorded for
a specific purpose, viz., so that for all posterity the
gentile nations will never be in the position of being able
to taunt the community of Israel with the claim that Israel
lacks clear title to those historic sites.
Rabbi
Bleich continues on page 191:
An
incisive observation regarding Abraham's purchase of this
site is attributed to Rabbi Samuel Molhiever, one of the
foremost exponents of religious Zionism. In purchasing this
parcel of land for use as a burial place Abraham paid more
that the fair market value. The land, according to rabbinic
sources, was not at all worth the 400 shekalim of highest
quality silver which Abraham paid. R. Samuel Molhiever remarked,
'The Torah here teaches us a lesson of great significance.
The Torah emphasizes that there is no price that is too
high even for the smallest portion of the Land of Israel.'
Indeed, there is no price that is too high, not only assessed
in shekalim and kesita, or dollars and lira, but even in
terms of the emotional coin which a Jew is, at times, called
upon to pay.
In
the same vein is Rashi's commentary on B'reshit, concerning
the very first pasuk. He cites Rabbi Yitzhak as follows:
It
was not necessary to begin the Torah, [whose main objective
is to teach commandments and mitzvot, with this verse] but
from This month shall be unto you the [beginning of months]
[Sh'mot 12:2], since this is the first mitzva that Israel
was commanded. And what is the reason that this begins with
B'reshit? Because of [the verse] The power of His works
He hath declared to His people in giving them the heritage
of the nations [Tehillim 111:6]. For if the nations
of the world should say to Israel: 'You are robbers, because
you have seized by force the lands of the seven nations'
they [Israel] could say to them, 'The entire world belongs
to the Holy One, Blessed Be He, He created it and gave it
to whomever it was right in His eyes. Of His own will He
took it from them and gave it to us.' [Yalkut, Sh'mot
12:2]
Finally,
a section of Tanakh -- Tehillim 105:44-45 states:
And
He gave them the lands of the nations and the labor of the
people did they inherit. That they might keep His statutes
and observe His laws.
If
indeed these are the facts, if Jewish thought rests upon the
validity of the Torah being true, then the halakhic decisions
derived must conform to these truths. Why cannot a Jewish
polity be formed in Lithuania or Brooklyn?
Simply
put, G-d give the Jewish people a place and that place is
the Land of Israel. The question of why the Land of Israel
is thus answered. If a Jew is to accept one tenant of the
Torah, he must, in order to be logically consistent, accept
the whole of Torah. Likewise, if a person is to accept that
he is Jewish then he must define this concept upon viable
and authentic Jewish sources and render precise his own actions
accordingly. Any other alternative to this is something other
than Judaism. That is, a person may, given free-will, live
according to what is right in his own eyes, however, he must
be rationally forced to understand that it is of his own devise
and should be so called as such.
The
only rational conclusion, the only Jewish conclusion, to what
has been said is that which we have stated above, viz., that
the notion of Jewish national existence is intrinsic to all
Jewish thought and practice from both a halakhic point of
view and a philosophic perspective. Despite this fact and
given the preponderance of evidence brought down by Rabbi
Bleich, he and the rabbis that share his opinion, have chosen
to remain outside of the understanding of these sublime notions.
This is indeed further proof of the damage wrought not only
by living outside the Land, but what two millennia without
a Jewish nation has brought into the confines of accepted
halakhic thought. The choice to exercise the moral obligation
consists in endowing the necessary instruments with the power
to educate and to build a Jewish nation.
Rabbi
Elazar ben Azarya, stressed:
Without
Torah there is no civic order, and without civic order there
is no Torah. Without wisdom there is no fear of G-d, and
without fear of G-d there is no wisdom. Without knowledge
there is no intelligence, and without intelligence there
is no knowledge. Without food there is no Torah, and without
Torah there is no food. [Mishna Avot 3:20]
The
idea here is that each component of these pairs helps create
and completes its counterpart. The example of knowledge and
intelligence, however, is a very delicate problem of philosophy.
I mention it, relying on the understanding of those who take
up this problem. The knowledge which comes to us and which
we acquire, in turn, lets us understand the reasons to which
it leads, if the whole idea is analyzed in detail and understood,
or we can understand the separate reasons in their essence
without applying them as knowledge. But the reasons themselves
constitute essentially items of knowledge. This understanding
is called intelligence, and it constitutes knowledge in itself,
while knowledge is a medium for intelligence in that it makes
it possible for us to understand whatever we do understand.
It is like saying that if we do not understand the reason,
we do not have real knowledge, while, if we have no knowledge,
we do not understand the reason, because we understand it
only based on our knowledge. To understand this idea is very
difficult, even from the books written specially on this subject,
all the more from this short passage. We only intended to
point out the right path. [Rambam's Commentary on the Mishna]The
right path is a knowledge of the whole of intelligence that
makes up Torah so that it may be applied through intelligence
as knowledge and not as intelligence through knowledge or
knowing of it. Torah is a closed system of practical application
while at the same time an open ended gateway of knowledge.
To choose the right path is to understand this duality as
a human misconception of a single divine idea.
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